In this paper, a testing method suitable for strengthening fault tolerance in the event of unexpected situations within a software system is presented. It is based on the idea of testing an integrated system, by substituting system components with other, similar in design and functionality that operate in an erroneous and even malicious manner. The approach adopted, is similar to the concept of inserting a virus within an organization so that the defense mechanisms of the latter can be tested and the necessary lines of defense are formed, so that the virus cannot affect any of the organization critical parts. The focal point is to ensure that in case of a module malfunction, the integrated system will continue to operate, isolating the malfunctioning software at the greatest possible extend, preventing the erroneous behavior from affecting other (and sometimes critical) modules. The testing method proposed is based first on isolated components testing adopting and enhancing the Component Off The Self method, and second on integrated system testing using malicious components that emulate erroneous operation.
Introduction
In this paper, a method for providing a testing scheme suitable for strengthening fault tolerance in the event of unexpected situations within a software system is presented. As fault tolerance, we define the ability of software to produce system outputs according to system specifications, regardless of the tested component inputs. Hence, the final system will encompass the ability to locate malicious states that may endanger its operation. Furthermore, the testing scheme targets at ensuring that even if the error occurred has not been anticipated, the effect caused will be confronted in the system internal interfaces between the components, deterring the damaging consequences [1, 2, 3] . The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we provide a description of past work on component testing and the advantages and disadvantages that these methods have. In the following section, the Malicious Code Testing method is presented. This presentation consists of the following parts. The first is the description of the method principles and the structures used for the deployment of the method. Next, the two phases of the method and testing algorithm used are explained. The next section of the paper provides an example of using the method for testing a simple routine. The final section provides conclusions on the use of the proposed method and presents the way it deals with the weaknesses of other component based methods, while it displays and some ideas for future work.
Past work based on component testing
Testing approaches presented in the past have always focused in confronting erroneous situations based on testing over improbable (but anticipated) events [1, 2, 4] . A characteristic example is the Components Off The Self (COTS) [5, 6] methodology. These algorithms deal with component interface testing limited on components incorporated in the system, without any knowledge about their internal functionality, relying solely on information given either from the components vendor or the system's integrator. This information consists of component's specifications and scenarios to introduce the system in failure situations. The COTS algorithms perform testing based on fault injection, data collection techniques and machine learning algorithms. In order to identify system component anomalous behavior, COTS algorithms described in approaches [5, 6] , provide a wrapper that controls the inputs and outputs of the component's interfaces. This wrapper has a significant impact over the tested software in terms of size and complexity. Furthermore, each of the above approaches requires additional effort in order, first to define the component's exact functionality and second to determine its behaviour. It should also be noted that since the above algorithms follow a staged approach in which each testing stage is initiated upon provision of the related input types from the integrator (and is limited to these types), the time schedule of the testing is prone to delays appearing in the interval between the completion of a stage and the provision of the inputs for the next. Moreover, the tests are focussing only on faulty inputs and outputs of the component, based on the assumption that a faulty output is caused only by a faulty input. In this way, there is no provision for tests related to abnormal functionality caused by internal component errors (which may appear even in the cases of valid inputs). In these cases, since the illegal output is not directly related to the input, the aforementioned COTS testing methods may fail in locating the error. Another major issue is that COTS algorithms do not provide any kind of regression testing. Regression testing is "the selective re-testing of a system or component to verify that modifications have not caused unintended effects" [7] . Therefore, it helps reducing the overall effort by assisting the debugging process in correcting the errors faster and more efficiently. COTS algorithms, by simply reporting the behaviour of tested components according to specific input lists, do not provide the means for advancing to the next step required for regression testing, being the identification of the erroneous behaviour through the reporting of faulty functionality in combination with the related data. Coming now to the issue of equitable operation and system evaluation in terms of acceptance testing decision, in the case of COTS methods this is entailed only as an aggregate on the volume of the passed/failed tests of the individual system components. Since each component is tested separately, the reports produced are reflecting the results of isolated component testing, ignoring cases of side effects or interferences such as the one mentioned earlier in the example of faulty variable definition. Such an approach is overlooking the side effects that a component's faulty operation may introduce in an integrated system. Finally, the COTS methods, through the production of test reports simply as a feedback to specific test list provided by the component's integrator, they actually discard any knowledge acquired through the testing procedure. Such a knowledge, being for example new faulty outputs, not previously anticipated, could be used in future tests as new inputs in order to provide a more comprehensive testing framework.
The Malicious Component Insertion (MCI) method
The method is based on the idea of testing an integrated system, by substituting system components with other, similar in design and functionality that operate in an erroneous and even malicious manner. Hence, it is named Malicious Component Insertion (MCI) method. The prototype and the malicious component have the exact same behavior in terms of operation and interfaces. The difference is that the malicious component is producing only invalid and erroneous outputs on the same interfaces as the prototype. The method combines individual component and overall system testing. To support it, a structure for organizing the necessary tests which generate error messages or exceptions is used. These types can be constraints that the development team should have predefined during system design and development. For example, using techniques such as the Boundary Value Analysis and the Equivalence Partitioning [8] , the developer of the system will be able to introduce some values to the specific list. The list is expected to contain standard entries which will be enriched with test types produced as feedback from tests performed using the MCI method, as it will be explained later. The advantage of the proposed approach lies in the fact that the erroneous inputs-outputs are inserted in a Test Type List (TTL) which holds all test types expected to generate error messages or exceptions. The specific list can be used for the production of test scripts for similar systems due to the resemblance in characteristics of the listed attributes. This list can also be used for regression testing. Since specific inputs cause specific failures, the proposed method is able to collect these data and reduce the effort needed in case of erroneous component's behaviour. Although software testing focuses on ensuring that software accomplishes the specified function correctly, the idea presented in this paper goes far beyond than that. The focal point is to ensure that the software continues to operate correctly even in of the presence of unusual systemevents or malicious attacks [9] . The scheme proposed uses fault injection analysis [10, 11] to determine the effect of unusual behavior of the software. This is possible by deploying a process of corrupting a data state during program execution and evaluating the effect of that corruption. The analysis may comprise of simple measurements that clarify whether the corrupted state affected a particular output or advance even further by determining whether system attributes such as safety, security, or survivability have been affected [12] .
A two phased approach
The MCI method is based on a two phased approach, in order to provide the necessary functionality for both individual (component oriented) and integrated (system oriented) testing. Through this approach, overall system testing is achieved through a process of comprehensive tests over each individual component, building the framework for integrated testing. The two phases are complementary since the output of each phase is provided as feedback to the other. In the first phase, similarly to the COTS testing approach [5] , all system components are identified as unique and independent modules that can be separately tested. For the needs of the method, a classification of two symmetric entities is made. The first entity types are defined as "positive" components. These are the individual components that comprise the system. Each of these is expected to provide the actual and predefined set of outputs that are designed to, during the tests performed in phase 1. The "positive", under test component is placed in an isolated environment and its interfaces are "feed" with erroneous inputs in order to evaluate its behavior. The second entity types are defined as "negative" components. These are the symmetric components that during the phase 2 tests are expected to produce all the erroneous outputs tested as inputs at phase 1. These outputs can be produced by using custom built code performing the fault injection technique. Negative components have a one to one relationship with the corresponding positive ones. They are formed right after the successful completion of a test on a positive component, have the same interfaces, but their operational role is to produce all sorts of illegal or "unexpected" outputs. By this, the process of substitut-ing a positive component with a negative provides a valuable tool in order to test how the integrated application reacts in erroneous situations created by illegal or unpredicted outputs of application sub-components. After the successful completion of phase 1, all the positive components have been tested and the negative components have been clearly identified. From this point, phase 2 can start. During this phase, the integrated system will be tested by substituting all positive components (one at a time) with the corresponding negative ones. By this, the system behaviour is evaluated and all the effects on the component interfaces and side effects are reported in order to be resolved. We must note that since the model targets at testing and discovering the possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the integrated system, phase 2 may be interrupted whenever the report statistics indicate that the system is not adequately robust, in order to perform all the necessary modifications, and the testing process can start again from phase 1. The method is based on the use of a component testing algorithm described in the following paragraphs of the paper. This algorithm provides the logic used in order to perform full tests both on component and on system level. To test each component of the system, the testing algorithm uses an Interface Testing Routine, applied to each of the system components described later in the paper.
Component Testing Algorithm
As it has been described, the algorithm is based on the use of positive and negative components that bear a one to one relationship with each other. Accordingly, two lists are used in order to store these components during the execution of the algorithm. The first list contains all the system components. It is the Positive Components List (PCL). Each component is inserted in the list during the initialization procedure, and is extracted from the list once the testing procedure for this component is successfully terminated. Symmetrically to this list, a second list named Negative Component List (NCL) is used. This list holds all the "negative" components of the system. Similarly to the procedures used for the management of the PCL, each negative component is inserted in the NCL once this component is formed based on the corresponding positive component, and is extracted later, once the testing procedure using this negative component has been terminated. Finally, a special list called Test Type List (TTL) is used to hold the test types expected to generate error messages or exceptions. This list is constantly updated from the reports produced during different system tests and is used as an evolving global testing library. As mentioned previously, the algorithm is based on a two phase approach. The first is based on standard component testing and is used for setting up the environment for the execution of the second phase, in which overall system testing will be performed based on the insertion of negative (malicious) components. Figure 1 graphically depicts the two phases of the MCI method.
Figure 1: MCI method test phases
The logic used for testing during phase 1, is presented in the following. Phase 1: Component testing and negative component creation. The first phase is starting with the definition of all individual system components. The scope of this action is to fully and individually describe each of the system's components in order to be tested separately in the following steps of process. Once all the components have been identified as unique and individual entities, they are inserted sequentially in the PCL and the testing process is initiated. This process relies on a loop that examines if the PCL is empty. If the list is not empty, then the next system component of the PCL is tested. During the testing, each interface of the examined component will be tested under the effect of erroneous inputs. As erroneous inputs we define those inputs that are unexpected to occur, yet they must be protected against [4] . The utility of such inputs is to ensure that the tested system component does not malfunction. If the testing fails, a report is generated informing the user that the component under test failed to operate correctly. The process proceeds by selecting the next positive component for test. If the test is successful, the component's "negative model" is defined. The "negative" model is now inserted in the NCL, while the next positive component is extracted from the PCL. The above loop is executed until the PCL is empty, meaning that the NCL now contains all the negatives components that can be used from the next stage of the algorithm to test the overall system behavior. At this point, the algorithm has tested all system components and can guarantee safe operation of each one individually. However, the most important result is the definition of the negative components that can now be used during the second "malicious testing" phase, in which the overall system performance and stability will be subjected to excessive testing. The logic used for testing during phase 2, is presented in the following. Phase 2: Overall system testing. The second phase starts with the formation of an integrated system that will be tested according to the following procedure. Each negative model will replace its related positive, in order to test the overall system behavior. Each replacement will take place in each of the process iterations. This process relies on a loop that examines if the NCL is empty. If it is not, then the first negative component is extracted from the list and substitutes the correspondent positive component within the system. After that, the system tests begin. During the testing period, the negative component produces all the erroneous outputs that the corresponding positive component would never present, if functioning in default conditions. The objective is to check the reaction of the system in case one of the system components presents a malfunction, and to determine the effect this will have on the operation of the system components to which it interacts. If the testing is successful, the next component is replaced by its reverse model. If not, the components that failed to operate correctly are identified and the behavior of the system is recorded. The process checks for any new kind of test types among the test results. The new test types may derive from the produced outputs of the failed component. Upon appearance of a new test type, this is considered a possible entry in the TTL, and if the evaluation of this new test type concludes that it is not covered by existing entries in the TTL, then it is inserted in the list. Following, the components that failed to operate are inserted in the PCL in order to be re-tested with the inputs that cause their failure and their reverse models are extracted from the NCL. The above loop is executed until the NCL is empty. At this point, the algorithm has tested the system by using all the available negative components, and the results of the tests have been recorded. The produced reports are a very important result of this process. They can be used to provide useful information for the debugging procedure because they can spot the part of the system that failed to operate correctly. Another advantage provided by these reports is the assistance in definition of the regression testing strategy. Given the failed component, the associated ones along with the inputs that cause the failure, the tester is able to focus his testing effort in the specific problematic area.
Interface Testing Routine
The routine is based on the use of component interfaces and test types. Two lists are deployed for storing and retrieving these resources during the execution of the algorithm. The first list contains all the component interfaces. It is the component interfaces list (CIL). Each interface is extracted from the list once its testing is started. The second list consists of all specific test types that are related to specific interfaces. This list is the Interface Test List (ITL). ITL is a sub-list of the TTL because it refers on specific component interfaces. According to the above, the first step of the routine is the identification of all the individual component interfaces. The scope of this action is to isolate each of the interfaces in order to be tested separately in the following steps of the process. Once all the component interfaces have been identified, they are inserted in the CIL. Following, the testing process is initiated based on a loop that examines if the CIL list is empty. If it is not empty, the test types for the specific interface are identified and are inserted in the ITL. In case of all the available test types for the specific interface have been performed, the next available interface is extracted from CIL and it is selected to be tested. In the opposite case, the next test type is extracted from ITL, in order to be used as input to the specific interface. This loop is executed until all the test types of ITL entry have been performed to the selected interface. If the interface functions correctly, the process proceeds with the next interface found in the CIL. Else, the results are recorded. The loop is executed until the CIL is empty, meaning that the testing of the specific system component has ended and the testing of the next one has started. The results of this execution are test reports describing the evaluation of the failed component interfaces. Given the interface that failed to operate correctly and the directly associated interfaces, the testing effort in the next iteration of the algorithm is reduced since the tester can focus only in this problematic area.
Method use example
In order to explain the use of the MCI method in practice, a small example will be presented, based on the implementation of a routine for the calculation of the roots of the following equation: "ax2 + bx +c = 0" using the method of the discriminant. The routine provides an interface for getting user inputs (being the parameters of the equation), performs the necessary calculations, and displays the result of the discriminant and the roots of the equation, or reports an error message in case the above calculations cannot be performed.
The routine consists of three sub-routines. The first sub-routine is the actionPerformed( ) which is the component that read user's entries and calculates the discriminant. The second sub-routine is the calcRoot1( ) which is the component that calculates the first root of the equation and the third one is the calcRoot2( ) which is the component that calculates the second root of the equation.
The routine will now be tested using the MCI method. First, each of the three distinct components of the routine will be isolated in order to be tested separately. The components are inserted in the PCL, and the first testing phase starts with the tests on actionPerformed( ). The failed tests are reported, the necessary corrections are made, and the testing procedure is repeated until the tests are successful. At this point we proceed with the definition of the negative component, named as N(actionPerformed( )). The testing procedure will be repeated according to the model's algorithm for components calcRoot1( ) and calcRoot2( ). Once the tests are successful, the N(calcRoot1( )) and N(calcRoot2( )) negative components will be placed in the NCL. The component actionPerformed( ) will be substituted first. For the needs of the testing, we perform all tests provided from the ITL. The entries of the ITL list in case of the actionPerformed( ) component appear in Table 1 . The negative model of the component is incorporated into the system in order to provide erroneous outputs and the system's reaction to these outputs is recorded. The list of outputs consists of two test types categories. The first category consists of the test types initially defined according to the rules described above (i.e. Boundary Value Analysis, Equivalence Partitioning [8] ). The second category consists of the outputs produced from the test from the first phase. In this way we achieve an increment on the number of the test cases performed. The outputs provided by the negative model appear in Table 2 . We can detect two major advantages of this approach. First, the test cases are increased creating the tendency for more exhaustive testing, and second, this set of input/output can be used in regression testing of the failed (as well as the interacting) components after all the appropriate modifications have been made.
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Conclusions and future extensions to the model
In this paper we have discussed about a model that combines individual component and overall system testing. This approach, adopts the techniques proposed by the COTS algorithms, in order to build a solid testing framework in which vulnerabilities can be tested not only in terms of individual components, but also in the context of an integrated system, covering component interactions and side-effects. In this way, it aims at confronting all the weak points of the COTS algorithms presented earlier in the paper. In details, the limitation posed by an input driven testing list provided by the component integrator, is lifted by the formation of a knowledge base constantly updated by the testing results, used to provide feedback for future tests. Therefore, the tests are not limited by the knowledge provided by the integrator about the system under test, but are gradually enriched by embodying information acquired gradually from different testing iterations. Additionally, COTS algorithms provide test reports containing the erroneous inputs/outputs and the component's deviant actions. The MCI method makes a step forward, using the data provided from the test reports in order to perform regression testing, decreasing the required time during the debugging procedure. Regarding system evaluation in terms of acceptance testing decision, in the case of COTS methods, this is entailed only as an aggregate on the volume of the passed/failed tests of the individual system components. In our approach the evaluation of the system is a combination of component's and overall system performance. Currently we are working towards the modeling of the MCI method, in order to create a management system that will administrate the testing approach. We also plan to implement a warning mechanism deploying different levels of alarms issued upon insertion of a new entry to the TTL. These alarms will be used as risk assessment indicators of the system under the effect of erroneous inputs, to provide quality metrics capable of displaying the level of system vulnerability.
